[Edaily Reporter Kim Hyun-ah ] The financial crisis that has engulfed JTBC is not merely a case of managerial failure at a single broadcaster. It is an incident that exposes the structural limitations inherent in the K-content ecosystem. It serves as a case study illustrating what strategies domestic media companies should adopt in the era of global platforms, and how outdated regulations undermine the industry’s ability to adapt.

Of course, JTBC’s decision to aggressively expand investments without securing a stable revenue base since its launch was a misjudgment on the part of management. On top of that, excessive betting on sports broadcasting rights and a “all-in” strategy on Netflix exacerbated the crisis.

The Paradox of a 7000억 Bet… Why Did Sports Exclusivity Become a Burden?

JTBC invested approximately 7000억 to secure broadcasting rights for the 2026–2032 Olympics and World Cups. Of this amount, the rights fee for the upcoming CONCACAF World Cup alone amounts to about 1900억.

The problem lies in the revenue recovery structure. The amount resold to KBS and Naver is reported to be around 55 billion won. Sports broadcasting is a high-risk business where advertising revenue fluctuates significantly depending on the national team’s performance. With the national team’s early elimination from this tournament now confirmed, it is highly likely that the advertising revenue JTBC had anticipated will fall far short of initial expectations.

Even Naver (NAVER(035420)), with its massive user base, finds it difficult to generate stable revenue from sports broadcasting alone. Exclusive broadcasting rights have turned out to be a critical financial burden for broadcasters rather than a means of securing competitiveness.

Boosting Netflix While Weakening Its Own Platform

The platform strategy also leaves much to be desired. JTBC granted Netflix priority access to its content in exchange for stable annual revenue of around 10 billion won.

While this secured cash in the short term, the network failed to strengthen the competitiveness of its own platform in a market shifting toward OTT. Viewers began consuming JTBC content on global OTT services rather than TV channels, weakening the direct influence of the JTBC brand.

Compounding this, the termination of the “JTBC monthly subscription” packages offered by the three IPTV providers further reduced its direct subscription-based revenue stream. In effect, the company has lost both its platform competitiveness and its stable cash flow.

Management Failure Is the Direct Cause… But Regulations Are Blocking the Way Out

As such, the direct cause of JTBC’s crisis lies in the strategic decisions made by its management. However, there are few options available to overcome this crisis.

The current Broadcasting Act imposes strict restrictions on equity participation and investment by large corporations. In an era where they must compete with global OTT services, it is difficult for domestic broadcasters to attract external capital or pursue bold business restructuring. This is why critics point out that the company lacks the structural flexibility needed to recover from management failures.

Consequently, the burden of restructuring is falling on the production front lines—including screenwriters and staff. Cuts to production budgets lead to weaker content competitiveness, creating a vicious cycle that in turn results in declining revenue.

Same Content Industry, Different Choices… Piccoma’s Ecosystem Strategy

There are examples of companies within the same content industry that have chosen a different path. Kakao Piccoma, a webtoon platform that has expanded into Japan, is focusing on an expansion strategy that leverages its own webtoon IP rather than engaging in a cutthroat competition to secure external content for its “video” service. By launching “Anime,” a short-form animation series that combines AI technology, the company has reduced production costs and time while firmly establishing a consumer ecosystem that spans webtoons, animations, and merchandise.

Unlike JTBC, which spent astronomical sums to purchase “third-party content” and relied on “third-party platforms,” it is difficult to dismiss the difference between Piccoma—which circulates its “proprietary IP” within its “own ecosystem”—and JTBC as merely a difference between legacy broadcasting and new media.

The JTBC Crisis Is Not the End, but the Beginning

This crisis is not just a problem for a specific broadcaster. If domestic content companies fail to build their own platforms and IP ecosystems and remain merely as suppliers to global platforms, a second or third JTBC could emerge at any time.

It is now time to move beyond a regulatory framework that treats broadcasting and OTT separately and instead reform the system to view them as a single audiovisual media market. Although it is late, it is fortunate that the “Audiovisual Media Act” has been proposed to the National Assembly’s Science and ICT Committee. The Broadcasting Act must be redesigned to meet the needs of the times, and tax and R&D support for domestic operators must be expanded.

I hope this opportunity will also be used to discuss “universal access to broadcasting” from the outset. Rather than taking for granted a system where a specific broadcaster bears astronomical costs to broadcast sports for free, we need to shift the policy paradigm toward supporting digital access to events of national interest for vulnerable groups.

JTBC’s crisis is not merely a failure to secure broadcasting rights. It serves as a warning of what happens when the K-content industry fails to shift its focus from “content sales” to “platforms and IP ecosystems.” I believe what is needed now is to redesign the strategies and systems of the entire media industry.