[Edaily Reporter kim kwanyong ] As discussions on merging the Army, Navy, and Air Force academies gain momentum, a survey has revealed that more than six out of ten active-duty officers and cadets believe the quality of cadets has declined compared to the past. In particular, while the admission competition rate remains in the double digits, the academies have consistently failed to fill all available spots over the past five years, and the survey also found that withdrawals and requests for early discharge after commissioning are on the rise.

Some point out that the essence of the crisis facing the military academies lies not simply in whether to merge the schools, but in the overall officer training system—including securing top talent, educational competitiveness, and incentives for long-term service.

According to the report “Study on Measures to Promote the Integration of Military Academies,” submitted last April by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in response to a commission from the Ministry of National Defense, when officers and cadets were asked to compare the quality of current cadets to that of the past, an average of 64.1% responded that it had “declined.” The response “similar” accounted for 31.1%, while “improved” accounted for only 4.8%. The report analyzed that, among the factors contributing to the decline in cadet quality, more than 40% of both officers and cadets cited “declining preference for an officer’s career” as the primary cause. Among cadets, 30.8% cited “a lack of autonomy in cadet life” as a reason.

In particular, 86.6% of officers and 90.6% of cadets responded that the prestige of the military academy has declined compared to the past. Additionally, 56.6% of officers and 56.1% of cadets viewed the academy’s current standing as “on par with a university ranked within the top 20 in the country.” As for the reasons behind this decline in status, both officers and cadets most frequently cited “a shortage of outstanding cadets,” followed by a lack of educational autonomy and openness, as well as lower educational quality and conditions compared to civilian universities.

It also became clear that “location” is another factor in the integration debate. In particular, the survey found that the Army Academy’s location in Seoul has a significant impact on its ability to attract top talent.

When current cadets were asked why they chose their respective military academies, “desire to serve as an officer in that branch of the military” was the most common reason at 40.6%, followed by “career prospects after graduation” at 32.3%. However, among RMA cadets, 22.2% cited “geographic location” as their reason for choosing the academy. This is significantly higher than the overall average of 12.6%. In contrast, only 1% of Air Force Academy cadets cited geographic location as their reason. Among Air Force Academy cadets, 62.9% stated they chose the academy because of post-graduation career prospects.

Accordingly, the report projected that even if the Army Academy were relocated outside of Seoul, applicants with a sense of mission to contribute to the nation or a sense of duty as military personnel would continue to apply. However, it analyzed that the loss of some applicants who strategically applied to the Army Academy specifically because of its location in the Seoul metropolitan area would be inevitable. In particular, applicants who placed a high priority on economic benefits or job stability tended to view the Seoul location as a key selection criterion.

The merger is also expected to require significant financial resources. The report estimated that if a new integrated campus were to be built in the Daejeon-Chungcheong or Gwangju-Jeonnam regions, construction costs would amount to approximately 430.6 billion won for the full integration of the three military academies, and approximately 602.97 billion won for the integration of all four academies, including the Third Army Academy. For the “2+2 model”—in which only first- and second-year students receive integrated education, while third- and fourth-year students are educated at their respective military academies—the costs were analyzed at 219.7 billion won for three academies and 305.63 billion won for four academies. Construction is expected to take approximately seven years.

The current costs allocated to military academies are already substantial. As of 2023, the four-year training cost per cadet at the Korea Military Academy was approximately 270.29 million won—about 3.5 times the average of 78.1 million won at civilian universities. The two-year training cost for a cadet at the Third Army Academy was 141.59 million won. However, the report analyzed that, despite the large absolute scale of training costs, the real growth in educational investment—taking inflation into account—has stagnated compared to private universities. In other words, it points out that there is a structural problem where, despite high spending, investment in educational facilities and faculty is not effectively concentrated.

Issues with the faculty were also identified. The faculty staffing rates were 93.3% at the Korea Military Academy, 83.3% at the Korea Naval Academy, and 78.6% at the Third Army Academy, whereas the Korea Air Force Academy stood at only 69.5%. The proportion of civilian faculty also varied significantly by school: 32% at the Army Academy, 50% at the Naval Academy, 27% at the Air Force Academy, and 14% at the Third Army Academy. The report analyzed that the rotational faculty system makes it difficult to secure outstanding professors, and that issues with the expertise of some faculty members are also factors undermining educational competitiveness.

The short tenure of academy presidents was also identified as a problem. The position of academy president is generally treated as a stepping stone for generals following a promotion, resulting in a short actual tenure; consequently, it is difficult to consistently pursue mid- to long-term educational policies or innovations.

Contrary to the high competition for admission, the phenomenon of failing to fill enrollment quotas continues. According to the report, the number of cadets admitted to the Army Academy relative to its quota was 311 out of 330 in 2021, 313 in 2022, 310 in 2023, 294 in 2024, and 312 in 2025. At the Naval Academy, with a quota of 170, the number of cadets admitted during the same period was 164, 163, 159, 168, and 163, respectively, while at the Air Force Academy, with a quota of 235, the numbers were 213, 195, 224, 205, and 227, respectively. In particular, the Army Third Officer Candidate School, with a capacity of 550, saw enrollment drop from 523 in 2021 and 532 in 2022 to 464 in 2023 and 389 in 2024, before recovering to 460 last year.

In contrast, the admission competition ratios for the Army, Navy, and Air Force Academies remain in the double digits. The report analyzed that the admission competition ratios for the three military academies range from a recent low of 16.7 to 1 to a high of 32.6 to 1, showing a recovery trend since their decline in 2022. In the case of the Army Third Academy, the competition ratio for 2026 is 1.7 to 1, a significant decrease compared to 6.7 to 1 in 2017, ten years ago. The phenomenon of failing to fill all available spots despite high competition ratios demonstrates that the challenge for military academies is securing top-tier talent who actually enroll, rather than simply attracting a large number of applicants.

The problem of early attrition after commissioning is also growing. While officers who graduate from military academies are generally required to serve 10 years of mandatory service, they are granted a limited opportunity to be discharged in their fifth year of service. The report analyzed that the rate of fifth-year discharge applications among graduates of the Korea Military Academy has recently surged to 16%. The survey found that approximately 8–12.4% of officers who wish to discharge are unable to do so due to military personnel management constraints. The report interpreted this as a result of a weakened connection between the military values instilled at the academy and the actual conditions of service after commissioning.

KIDA ultimately assessed that individual military academies face structural limitations, such as difficulties in securing outstanding faculty, frequent changes in academy leadership, a lack of educational autonomy and openness, and the redundant operation of facilities and personnel. It viewed integration as one way to concentrate educational resources and enhance joint operations capabilities. However, the report emphasized that integration alone would not solve all problems and that institutional conditions—such as how to maintain the distinctiveness and expertise of each branch of the military, improvements in working conditions, personnel systems, and career guarantees—must be addressed simultaneously.