[Edaily Reporter Kim Sung-kon ] President Lee Jae-myung’s approval rating is in a precarious position. Just before the June 13 local elections, his approval rating was soaring in the mid-to-high 60s, but it has plummeted to the low 40s in just over two months. With the rating falling for four consecutive weeks and hitting a new low for the year, the possibility of it falling below the psychological threshold of 40% cannot be ruled out.

According to the weekly survey for the first week of August conducted by the polling firm Realmeter on behalf of the Energy Economy News, the positive rating for President Lee’s handling of state affairs fell 2.6 percentage points from the previous week to 43.3%, while the negative rating rose 2.5 percentage points to 53.0%. The “don’t know” response was 3.6%.

This is interpreted as resulting from a partial defection among his core support base—those in their 40s and 50s—and a widespread withdrawal of support from those in their 20s and 30s. Realmeter is not alone in this observation. A significant number of other polls also clearly show a decline in President Lee’s approval rating and a withdrawal of support from those in their 20s and 30s. This is a massive source of anxiety with an eye toward the upcoming general election and presidential election.

◇The “Generational Encirclement” Theory Emerged in 2022: A “Half-Victory” in the Showdown Between Young Men and Young Women

The formula for electoral victory is simple: secure your core base while winning over new voters. In other words, it involves solidifying traditional support bases—conservatives and progressives—while expanding the party’s reach to the moderate middle. A regional analysis reveals a similar pattern. In short, it means winning the battle for the central regions. Both the ruling and opposition parties must defend their strongholds in Yeongnam and Honam while securing even a single additional vote in the Seoul metropolitan area—the key battleground—or in the Chungcheong region, which traditionally holds the deciding vote.

A recent point of focus has been generational voting patterns, as they possess a stronger cohesive force than ideology or region. This marked the emergence of the so-called “generational encirclement theory.” Lee Jun-seok, leader of the Reform Party, proposed this electoral strategy—known as the “generational encirclement theory”—in 2022, during his tenure as leader of the People Power Party, ahead of the presidential election head-to-head matchup between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung among voters in their 20s. The core of the strategy was that the 20s and 30s—who tend to be anti-Democratic Party—and the 60s and 70s—the traditional conservative base—should unite to encircle the 40s and 50s, who strongly support the Democratic Party. It was a partial victory. While not the entire 20s and 30s demographic, it was primarily young men in their 20s who chose Yoon Suk-yeol over Lee Jae-myung.

This differed from traditional generational discourse. In the generational discourse prevalent since the 2000s, it was an unwritten rule that those in their 20s and 30s were progressive, while those in their 50s and 60s were conservative. The decisive factor was the 40-somethings. However, the traditional generational discourse has been shattered by the repercussions of low birth rates and an aging population. The progressive-leaning 20- and 30-somethings, who experienced South Korea’s World Cup semifinal run and Roh Moo-hyun’s election victory in 2002, have since entered their 40s and 50s and grown into the Democratic Party’s main force. The “86 Generation”—known as the “386s”—has also, as they’ve aged, continued to exhibit progressive leanings, sometimes even into their early 60s.

The problem was the emergence of the new 20s and 30s generation—the main force of the so-called MZ generation. Lee Jun-seok’s “generational encirclement theory” successfully captured the political characteristics of the 20s and 30s generation, who are particularly sensitive to issues of fairness and gender. Despite criticism that it pitted generations and genders against each other, it proved somewhat effective in the realm of practical politics. In fact, in the early days of the Moon Jae-in administration, when Incheon International Airport Corporation converted approximately 1,900 non-regular security screeners to regular employees, young people reacted with such intensity that it took the older generation by surprise. Even during the 2019 Cho Kuk scandal, unlike the 40s and 50s generation who called for prosecutorial reform, the 20s and 30s generation were relatively more outraged by issues of fairness.

◇ The “Fury Over Fairness”: People in Their 20s and 30s Angry Over Real Estate, the KOSPI, and “Bus Houses”

Since then, discourse on youth issues has become a full-fledged trend in the political circles of Yeouido. This marked the beginning of a more detailed examination of the lives of young people, which had remained stagnant for 20 years since the emergence of the “880,000-won generation” of non-regular workers during the Lee Myung-bak administration. In particular, the voter sentiment of the 20s and 30s generation—who face harsher conditions than the older generation in areas such as △employment, △marriage, and △homeownership—has emerged as a key variable in major elections. Both the ruling and opposition parties began recruiting prominent figures from the younger generation into national politics. The younger generation, in turn, strengthened its political presence by criticizing the “’86 Generation” as part of the established elite.

Moreover, the discourse surrounding those in their 20s and 30s has become even more explosive as it has intersected with gender issues. In particular, the debates surrounding “men in their 20s and 30s” and “women in their 20s and 30s” have intensified. In fact, President Lee Jae-myung received overwhelming support from young women, not young men. His defeat in the 2022 presidential election and his bid for redemption in the 2025 election are clear evidence of this. The main force that lit up the public squares with light following the December 3 state of emergency was also women in their 20s and 30s.

The once-thriving Lee Jae-myung administration has been in a state of continuous decline since the June 3 local elections. A series of megaton-level setbacks has emerged, including sharp fluctuations in the KOSPI, deteriorating public sentiment regarding real estate due to loan regulations and tax reform proposals, the controversy over the abolition of the prosecution’s supplementary investigation authority, and Democratic Party Representative Hwang Hee’s “bus house” proposal. This was like pouring gasoline on the fire of the 2030 generation’s anger. There was no distinction between young men and young women in this regard. Sensing the crisis, President Lee went so far as to post an article titled “22 Marriage Penalties Identified Through the Voices of Young People” on social media, promising improvements.

President Lee’s declining approval ratings could lead to a resurgence of Lee Jun-seok’s “generational encirclement” theory. Given the conservative leanings of the 60s and 70s generations, if the 20s and 30s generations defect, only the 40s and 50s generations—his core support base—will remain.

Eom Kyung-young, director of the Era Spirit Research Institute, “Since the June 3 local elections, the trend of the 20s and 30s becoming more conservative and drifting away from the Democratic Party has become increasingly pronounced,” noting, “Due to adverse factors—including the asset gap in real estate and the KOSPI, symbolized by the 84-square-meter national standard apartment and the Samjeon Nix leverage ETF, as well as the abolition of supplementary investigative authority—gender issues among the 20s and 30s are weakening, and there is a growing sentiment among both men and women to turn their backs on the President and the Democratic Party.” Professor Shin Yul of Myongji University stated, “This is not a matter of ‘generational encirclement’ resulting from the loss of support among the 20s and 30s. As even those in their 40s are turning away due to deteriorating public sentiment regarding real estate, the President’s momentum in governing is plummeting rapidly.” He predicted, “Unless the real estate issue is resolved and the supplementary investigative authority is reinstated, a further decline in the President’s approval rating for his handling of state affairs will be inevitable.”