[Edaily Reporter kim kwanyong ] On the 28th—seven days after the explosion, believed to have been caused by a landmine, occurred in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the western front on the 21st—a high-ranking military official held an official briefing. Amid ongoing political disputes over the “delayed investigation” regarding the timing of the on-site investigation, critics point out that there was a significant gap between the actual preparation process for the investigation and the military’s explanation of it. It has also been suggested that a leadership vacuum within the Army’s 1st Corps, which oversees the area, may have contributed to this communication confusion.

Hwang Ju-bong, Director of Operations 1 at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brigadier General), stated at the Ministry of National Defense’s regular briefing that day regarding the soldiers’ testimonies at the time of the accident: “There were statements to the effect that the object resembled a box mine and appeared to be made of plastic.” This means that service members at the scene saw a “mine resembling a wooden-box mine” near the accident site. It is also reported that some service members stated there were additional unexploded mines remaining in the area.

Later that day, after meeting with People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyuk, Defense Minister Kang Shin-chul spoke with reporters and emphasized that if the mine is ultimately confirmed to have been recently laid by North Korea, “a reasonable and commensurate response and measures will be necessary, and we will proceed accordingly.” The National Forensic Service (NFS) reportedly issued a preliminary finding that the explosion was caused by a landmine—presumed to be a North Korean one—after identifying traces of gunpowder and other evidence on items worn by the soldiers at the time of the incident.

This incident initially occurred during preparations for an on-site investigation by the UN Command’s Military Armistice Commission. After signs of North Korean landmine planting and changes in the terrain were identified near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) on the western front, and following related concerns raised in the National Assembly, the South Korean military and the UN Command moved to verify the situation on the ground. On the 21st, troops from the 25th Division were involved in the accident while clearing a new search route that had not previously existed.

It is reported that the visit by UNC officials to the 25th Division on the 22nd—the day after the incident—was originally scheduled to discuss the planned on-site investigation into the changes in terrain. Some in the opposition claimed that while the UN Command had demanded a swift on-site investigation immediately after the accident, the South Korean military had delayed it. However, military officials explained that following the consultation on the 22nd, the military and the UN Command devised safety measures and conducted a preliminary investigation on the 26th; furthermore, the main investigation—which had originally been scheduled for around the 29th—was moved up to the 27th based on the results of the preliminary investigation.

In fact, the investigation on the 27th lasted from 9:00 a.m. until sunset, but the team was unable to reach the exact point of the explosion. This was because they had to clear a new path through an unconfirmed minefield—where no existing search routes existed—using mine detectors, and the soldiers, equipped with protective gear and detection equipment, were significantly fatigued. It was an operation of such high risk and difficulty that the team failed to reach the point of origin even on the first day of the investigation.

Consequently, the military’s explanation that a certain amount of time was needed to prepare for the on-site investigation is considered credible. The problem, however, is that the military failed to properly explain these operational conditions and the investigation preparation process from the outset. Following the incident, questions arose regarding the purpose of the operation, the number of explosions, the location of the incident, and the details of consultations with the UN Command, but the military largely repeated only that the matter was “under investigation.” While their intention was to avoid hastily concluding the cause of the accident, critics point out that the military failed to distinguish between facts that had already been confirmed and matters still under investigation, thereby widening the information gap.

Meanwhile, the preparation period for ensuring safety was interpreted as an “investigation delay,” and the process of conducting a preliminary investigation on the 26th followed by the main investigation on the 27th was seen as a “schedule change driven by public opinion,” leading to a political back-and-forth. It is argued that the military brought unnecessary suspicion upon itself by failing to proactively explain that this was a standard investigation preparation process.

Both within and outside the military, some have raised the possibility that the vacancy in the position of 1st Corps Commander may have played a role in this process. Currently, the 1st Corps is operating under an acting commander system since its commander was relieved of duty last August. While the acting commander does exercise operational command authority, analysts suggest there may be limitations to his ability to actively enforce on-site judgments when opinions differ from higher-level units or to make responsible decisions regarding the scope of disclosure for sensitive information.

This is why the response is being compared to the 2015 North Korean “wooden box landmine” provocation. It is reported that Lieutenant General Kim Yong-woo, who was the 1st Corps commander at the time, actively conveyed field intelligence and assessments from subordinate units to Army Headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and provided the materials necessary for public briefings. In other words, even amid concerns regarding operational security and the disclosure of information, the commander in charge of the field persuaded higher-ups and determined the scope of disclosure.