[Edaily kim kwanyong· Reporter Noh Hee-jun] The government has decided to respond to the U.S. request for troop deployment to the Strait of Hormuz by expanding the operational area of the Cheonghae Unit and strengthening its capabilities, rather than engaging in direct military intervention. This is seen as a compromise that acknowledges the need to contribute within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance while taking into account the risk of being drawn into a war in the Middle East and public opposition to troop deployment.

The Ministry of National Defense announced on the 5th that it had approved a revised proposal to extend the deployment of the Cheonghae Unit at a vice-ministerial meeting. The plan expands the operational area—previously limited to the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia—to the southern outskirts of the Gulf of Oman and includes the additional deployment of one maritime patrol aircraft, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team, and unmanned mine-clearing equipment. The troop strength will increase by 75 personnel, from a maximum of 320 to 395. The mission statement has also been expanded to include “supporting the restoration of freedom of navigation in international maritime traffic lanes.”

It is believed that the government’s decision to adopt this approach was driven by two considerations: the ROK-U.S. alliance and the safety of our military. While it is difficult to continue ignoring U.S. requests for contributions to maritime security, deploying troops to the Strait of Hormuz—where actual warfare is taking place—would place a burden not only on the safety of service members but also on diplomatic relations with Iran. President Lee Jae-myung also drew a clear line last September, stating that there would be no troop deployment to participate in or intervene in a war between the U.S. and Iran.

Accordingly, the government has opted to strengthen the Cheonghae Unit’s existing anti-piracy mission while partially accommodating U.S. requests. According to the Ministry of National Defense, pirate activity off the coast of Somalia has more than tripled, rising from 11 incidents last year to 36 this year. The ministry explained that as naval forces from major powers have been concentrated in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea due to the war in the Middle East, a gap has emerged in anti-piracy capabilities in the Gulf of Aden.

A Ministry of National Defense official stated, “The top priority of this deployment is to strengthen our anti-piracy capabilities,” but added, “We also considered the goal of developing operational capabilities so that we can respond to requests from the international community once a safe environment is established.” This acknowledges that the additional deployment of forces is a preparatory measure for potential mine-clearing operations that may take place in the Strait of Hormuz in the future.

However, the government has clearly stated its policy of non-intervention in war and the maintenance of an independent command structure. The operational area does not include the Strait of Hormuz or the inner parts of the Gulf of Oman, and command authority remains with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Any future deployment to the Strait of Hormuz would require a safe environment—such as the end of the war—and separate approval from the National Assembly.

Experts assessed this as a realistic response given the limited diplomatic and security options. Doo Jin-ho, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, analyzed, “This is a compromise that comprehensively considers the ROK-U.S. alliance, ROK-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) relations, and ROK-Iran relations,” adding, “It appears to partially meet U.S. expectations while also taking into account the need to avoid entanglement in the war, the safety of deployed troops, and public acceptance.”

Yoo Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), also assessed it as “an approach that seeks to partially meet U.S. demands for maritime security cooperation while maintaining South Korea’s independent policy judgment and military autonomy.” However, he emphasized that “even without directly entering the Strait of Hormuz, the possibility of accidental clashes or exposure to asymmetric threats in surrounding waters cannot be ruled out,” stressing the importance of clearly defining the mission, maintaining an independent command structure, establishing rules of engagement, and engaging in diplomatic communication with Iran.

A compromise proposal utilizing the Cheonghae Unit’s operational area was also put forward in 2020. At that time, the Moon Jae-in administration chose to conduct an independent deployment—expanding the Cheonghae Unit’s operational area to include the Strait of Hormuz—rather than joining the U.S.-led coalition. However, the current situation differs from that time in that armed conflict between the U.S. and Iran is actually underway. This is why entry into the Strait of Hormuz has been ruled out entirely this time.

Backlash from political circles is a wild card. Kim Jun-hyung, floor leader of the Jooguk Innovation Party, criticized the move at a press conference on the 4th, stating, “Expanding the Cheonghae Unit’s operational area is a troop deployment—not a masterstroke, but a ploy.” In contrast, Kim Byung-ju, a Democratic Party of Korea lawmaker and ruling party secretary on the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, previously stated that changing the Cheonghae Unit’s operational radius does not necessarily imply a deployment to the Strait of Hormuz.