The Government Is Promoting the 'Bear Hug' Strategy, but... Management Control at 570 Undervalued Listed Companies Remains a 'Fortress'
[New Value-Up Measures, Controversy Over Hostile M&A] ③
Following the Commercial Code Revision, the Next Battle Is "Control Struggles"... A 'Bear Hug' Alone Is Not Enough
Approximately 570 Listed Companies Where Major Shareholders Hold a Majority Stake and the PBR Is Less Than 1
Samesco Korea Sees Change in Control with 12% Stake… In Contrast to Companies with Majority Ownership
Defending Management Control Through Affiliates’ Capital Injections… Will the Government Revise Shareholding Diversification Requirements?
[Edaily Marketin, Reporter JI YEONG-EUI ] Although the government has announced plans to use hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as leverage to pressure the management of undervalued listed companies, industry observers say that the ownership structures of domestic firms are holding them back. This is because in companies where major shareholders and related parties hold a majority stake, it is structurally impossible for external investors to seize control, no matter how much of a premium they offer. Critics point out that even the introduction of the “bear hug” system—which mandates the public disclosure of takeover bids—is insufficient to shake the voting power of entrenched controlling shareholders. The argument is that while the government, following amendments to the Commercial Act, has touted management control competition as a new means of enhancing corporate value, the real hurdle it must overcome is not the acquisition process itself, but rather the entrenched ownership structures of domestic companies.
[Edaily Reporter Lee Mi-na]
Hundreds of Listed Companies with Low Stock Prices but Secure Management Control
At a capital market policy roundtable chaired by the President and held on the 13th at the Korea Exchange in Yeouido, Seoul, Lee Seong-won, CEO of Trustone Asset Management, revealed that there are approximately 570 listed companies where the combined stake held by major shareholders and related parties exceeds 50 percent, while their price-to-book ratio (PBR) is less than 1. This accounts for about 22% of all listed companies. Although their stock prices fall short of their book value, these companies are free from pressure to lose management control because major shareholders and related parties hold a majority stake.
President Lee Jae-myung ordered a comprehensive review of institutional mechanisms that hinder hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on that day. Following the amendment to the Commercial Act, which strengthened board accountability, the plan is to encourage companies to increase their own value through competition for management control with external investors.
The problem is that lowering the barriers to the acquisition process is a separate issue from undermining the voting rights held by major shareholders. In companies where the controlling shareholders hold a majority stake, it is difficult for external investors to gain control even if they pool shares from other shareholders. Even if a takeover proposal is reviewed, the competition for control is effectively blocked if the major shareholder refuses to sell their shares.
While
there have been cases of a change in management with a 12% stake… it is not easy for companies with majority control
There have been actual
cases
of
a change in management
at companies with dispersed
shareholdings
. Last year, at the KOSDAQ-listed company Sam-E Korea, the investment vehicle Korea Wafer Holdings secured a 12% stake to become the largest shareholder. At the time, the existing largest shareholder held a 4.8% stake. After a standoff with the existing management, an agreement was reached ahead of the shareholders’ meeting, and on June 26 of that year, six directors representing the new management were appointed at the meeting. It appears that the fact the terms of the existing directors were expiring at that time—allowing for the appointment of new directors without a separate removal process—also played a role.
In contrast, in companies where the major shareholder and related parties hold a majority stake, it is difficult for other shareholders to change management even if they join forces. In companies with concentrated voting rights, a transfer of management control is unlikely to succeed unless the major shareholder sells their shares, even if an outside acquirer offers a high price.
The capital structure of affiliates within major Korean conglomerates is another factor that raises the bar for competition over management control. According to the Fair Trade Commission, as of May 1, the direct ownership stake held by the controlling family in the 89 major conglomerates with a controlling shareholder averaged just 3.5%. In contrast, the internal ownership stake—including that of affiliates—stood at 61.4%, with affiliates alone accounting for 55.5%. This structure allows the controlling family to maintain control over the conglomerate through investments in affiliates, even if they do not hold a large number of shares directly. This is why it is difficult for an outside investor to change the entire corporate governance structure simply by accumulating shares in a specific listed company.
Even if a ‘bear hug’ proposal is disclosed… there is no way to force a sale if it is rejected
The “Korean-style ‘bear hug’” being considered by the government and the ruling party is a proposal that would require the board of directors of a listed company to review any acquisition proposal it receives and disclose the results of its assessment along with the reasons for its decision. The intent is to prevent existing management from unilaterally rejecting acquisition proposals and to give minority shareholders an opportunity to weigh in. However, even if the board discloses the proposal, the process comes to a halt if the major shareholder, who holds a majority stake, simply refuses to sell.
Even activist funds, which have recently been making their mark in the domestic market, repeatedly hit a wall when faced with high major shareholder ownership stakes. Cha Partners Asset Management successfully appointed an auditor at this year’s Samyoung Electronics Industrial shareholders’ meeting by utilizing the “3% rule,” which limits the voting rights of major shareholders, but its shareholder proposal to repurchase and cancel treasury stock was rejected. While the firm achieved a notable success in establishing a foothold to monitor management, it proved difficult to change the company’s capital allocation policy.
Kim Hyung-kyun, Executive Director at Cha Partners Asset Management, said, “The government’s attempt to promote hostile M&A is a positive development in terms of the benefits that can be gained from fostering competition for management control,” but added, “However, in a market like Korea’s, where major shareholders hold such high stakes, it is virtually impossible for hostile M&A to succeed. For now, the only effective strategy is to use the 3% rule to appoint auditors and maintain internal checks and balances.”
Executive Director Kim added, “For companies whose undervaluation has been neglected for a long time, we could even consider delisting them,” noting, “For example, if companies with a PBR of 0.5x or lower were delisted, wouldn’t they try to bring their stock prices up to that level?”
Enjoying the Benefits of Listing While Maintaining Monopolistic Management… Will Share Distribution Requirements Be Revised
?
The issue of excessive share concentration among listed companies was also raised at a capital market policy roundtable chaired by the President. President Lee cited companies where major shareholders hold a majority stake while less than 10% of shares are publicly traded, and even raised the need to delist companies that operate virtually as private firms while merely reaping the benefits of being listed. In response, Financial Services Commission Chairman Lee Eun-won said he would examine whether the share dispersion criteria included in the current listing maintenance requirements are functioning properly.
The key question is whether revising the listing maintenance requirements can actually lead to competition for control. Even if the number of shares available on the market increases, it will still be difficult for outside investors to gain control if the major shareholder continues to hold a majority stake. In other words, hostile M&A can only become a realistic investment option if the voting rights held by the existing controlling shareholder can be challenged.
An official in the private equity fund (PEF) industry stated, “When considering a management takeover, we first assess how much of the shares are held by the major shareholder and their allies, and how many shares can actually be secured,” adding, “If the major shareholder holds a majority stake and has no intention of selling, it will be difficult to close the deal no matter how much acquisition funding is provided.”
He added, “Rather than simply providing funds, it may be more effective to increase the number of companies where actual competition for management control is possible by promoting share dispersion and improving conditions for exercising shareholder rights.”
KB Financial Group has ushered in the “Lee Jae-geun era.” The management vision of Lee Jae-geun, the newly appointed chairman of KB Financial Group, who has signaled a “generational shift,” is expecte…
curacle co., ltd.(365270)is moving forward with a U.S. Phase 2b clinical trial to develop an oral treatment for diabetic macular edema (DME). The trial will re-evaluate the treatment’s efficacy in pat…
#Aimed Bio Inc.’s antibody-drug conjugate (ADC) “BHV-1530 (AMB302),” which was licensed to U.S.-based Biohaven, has demonstrated initial anticancer efficacy in a Phase 1 clinical trial. Biohaven plans…