[New York = E-Daily Seong Joowon Correspondent] A U.S. expert on the Korean Peninsula has raised the hypothesis that the South Korean government may have notified North Korea in advance of the repatriation of North Korean prisoners of war. This is seen as one possible explanation for why the South Korean government is taking a hard line against Ukraine, even as North Korea remains silent on the issue of prisoner repatriation. However, it has not been confirmed whether such prior notification actually took place.

Victor Cha, Director of Geopolitics and Foreign Policy and Korea Chair at the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), highlighted this possibility in an article titled “Deepening Diplomatic Tensions Between Ukraine and South Korea” published on the 23rd (local time).
Cha cited a view recently presented by his colleague, researcher Sydney Siler, on a CSIS broadcast. The hypothesis suggests that the South Korean government may have sought to build a certain level of trust by notifying Pyongyang in advance of the repatriation of two North Korean prisoners of war, and that North Korea’s decision not to publicly raise an issue with this served as a stepping stone toward resuming inter-Korean dialogue.
Professor Cha assessed that, although this is a matter the South Korean government would find difficult to disclose publicly, this possibility could explain the government’s strong anger toward Ukraine. However, he did not present any concrete evidence to support the claim of prior notification.

North Korea Remains Silent, South Korea Responds Harshly… Why?

The diplomatic conflict between South Korea and Ukraine erupted after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly revealed during his speech at the UN General Assembly last September that two North Korean prisoners of war had been repatriated to South Korea. The South Korean government, citing a breach of the confidentiality agreement, recalled its ambassador to Ukraine and subsequently withdrew embassy staff.
The South Korean government cited the safety of the prisoners and their families in North Korea as the reason for its actions. However, Professor Cha noted that North Korea itself has not issued any official response regarding the repatriation of the prisoners. North Korea maintains its stance that it has no interest in inter-Korean dialogue.
Professor Cha also pointed out that the Lee Jae-myung administration is focusing on resuming dialogue with North Korea. At the UN General Assembly last September, President Lee emphasized peaceful coexistence with North Korea and expressed his willingness to engage in unconditional dialogue. Professor Cha analyzed that the public disclosure of the POW repatriation may have complicated this strategic approach toward North Korea.

Was Zelenskyy’s Public Disclosure of POW Repatriation Psychological Warfare Against North Korea?

Professor Cha also offered a new interpretation of President

Zelenskyy’s

intentions in

publicly disclosing the repatriation

of

the prisoners of war

. He argued that it was more likely a form of psychological warfare aimed at North Korea than a result of his being unaware of the existence of a confidentiality agreement.
The analysis suggests that Ukraine may have sought to send a message to Pyongyang that it could secure additional North Korean prisoners of war and hand them over to South Korea. Given the lack of practical means to curb North Korea’s supply of troops to Russia, it is possible that Ukraine used the prisoner issue as a bargaining chip.
Professor Cha explained that North Korea has sent up to 25,000 troops to Russia since late 2024. He pointed out, “China is keeping its distance, treating North Korea-Russia cooperation as a bilateral issue; U.S. nonproliferation measures have limitations in blocking North Korea’s military transactions and troop movements to Russia; and the UN Security Council is unable to impose additional sanctions on North Korea due to the vetoes of China and Russia.”

“The issue should be resolved through behind-the-scenes diplomacy rather than public exchanges.”

Professor Cha recommended that the South Korean government resolve the conflict with Ukraine

through behind-the-scenes diplomacy

rather than public exchanges in the media.
He also emphasized that North Korea-Russia cooperation is providing North Korea with enormous economic and strategic benefits. According to CSIS estimates, the economic benefits North Korea has gained by providing Russia with troops, ammunition, missiles, and labor could reach up to $14 billion (approximately 18.567 trillion won). Analysts estimate this amount exceeds 50% of North Korea’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).
Professor Cha assessed that the inflow of Russian food and fuel has enabled the North Korean authorities to regain control of the rationing system and curb the role of the market. He noted that as North Korea’s dependence on China has decreased due to its closer ties with Russia, constraints on North Korea’s foreign behavior are also diminishing.
He also cited the increased uncertainty in South Korea’s energy supply caused by the war in Iran as a new diplomatic variable. He predicted that South Korea may need to seek some form of agreement with Russia to mitigate the risks to crude oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. This means the diplomatic dilemma has become even more complex, as Russia—which is strengthening military cooperation with North Korea—could serve as a negotiating partner for South Korea to reduce its energy supply risks.