[Edaily Marketin Kwon so hyun Reporter] If we were to name the two most painful terms in this year’s corporate bond market, they would be JR Global REIT and Joongang Group. Both entities had a “stable” outlook attached to their credit ratings until they suddenly defaulted one day. At the 37th Edaily Credit Rating Expert Advisory Panel meeting, one participant voiced frustration, asking, “Do credit rating agencies really have the ability to predict defaults in the lower-rated segments?”
The case of JR Global REIT, in particular, raises questions about the proactiveness of credit ratings. While the market was severely shaken by the combined effects of falling overseas real estate values and deteriorating financing conditions, the credit rating agencies’ response was belated. Of course, there is an element of truth to the fact that the loss of the benefit of the term (EOD) occurred due to a unilateral assessment by an appraisal agency with which the asset management company disagreed.
However, it’s not as if there were no warning signs at all. The failure of the rights offering was one such sign. If no warning was issued despite the collapse of the capital-raising plan, one can only conclude that the agencies did not reach the limits of their predictive capabilities but rather chose to withhold judgment. The same applies to the Joongang Group case. Questions have been raised as to whether it was appropriate to maintain a stable outlook until credit risks actually materialized. Infographic created using generative artificial intelligence (AI). Credit rating agencies cannot identify every risk in advance. The financial statements and disclosed information that form the basis of their evaluations have inherent limitations. It is also difficult to accurately predict contingent liabilities among affiliates or sudden changes in the external environment beforehand. However, these limitations in information do not absolve them of their responsibility for proactive assessment. The competitiveness of credit rating agencies does not stem from merely compiling publicly available financial figures. It depends on the ability to identify risks not revealed by the numbers and to detect as early as possible the trends indicating a deterioration in a company’s financing conditions and business environment.
The asymmetry in rating adjustments is also worth noting. Recently, the ratio of credit rating upgrades to downgrades has widened to 2.77. This means that far more companies had their ratings upgraded than downgraded. While this reflects the fact that certain industries—such as semiconductors, shipbuilding, and defense—are enjoying a structural boom, some observers point out that the pace of upgrades and downgrades differs.
Credit rating agencies tend to raise ratings relatively quickly when a company’s performance improves or it nears the criteria for an upgrade. However, they are reluctant to downgrade ratings promptly when financial indicators deteriorate and risks increase. Even for sectors with a “negative” outlook, such as petrochemicals, ratings agencies are maintaining current ratings, citing ambiguous timing due to government restructuring efforts and a boom driven by the Middle East. Critics also point to the so-called “moving the goalposts” practice, where agencies change their evaluation methods and adjust the thresholds more leniently when indicators deteriorate.
Why can’t they downgrade first? The reason cited by advisory committee members is painfully honest: if they downgrade first, they risk losing rating assignments. Consequently, they hesitate and wait for other rating agencies to downgrade first. In the past, when one rating agency downgraded a subsidiary of a major conglomerate before its competitors, the market’s reaction was criticism, not applause. It took a long time for that judgment to be recognized as correct. If the price of issuing a preemptive warning is criticism, and there is no penalty for remaining silent, credit rating agencies will choose silence. The fact that corrective measures come too late may be a result of the atmosphere created by the market.
The question is who bears this cost. Ultimately, it is individual investors. Corporate bonds issued by JR Global REIT and affiliates of the Joongang Group were sold to retail bond investors by touting high interest rates. The void left by institutional investors was filled by individuals who relied solely on credit ratings and outlooks.
The authority of credit ratings is not built on high satisfaction with the ratings themselves. Credit rating agencies must be able to issue warnings—even those the market prefers to ignore—before risks materialize. Explaining risks that are obvious to everyone after a default has occurred is not a rating; it is commentary. What credit rating agencies must reclaim is not satisfaction with high ratings, but the market’s trust in them as watchdogs who warn of risks first.
[This article was published in the 37th SRE (Survey of Credit Ratings by Edaily) booklet produced by Edaily.]
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