Why Take the Risk of Damaging Their Reputation?... Public Funds Reluctant to Invest in Hostile M&As
[Controversy Over Hostile M&A as a New 'Value-Up' Strategy] ②
Blue House Considers Bear Hug Support Fund… LPs Remain Cautious
National Pension Service Specifies Condition Excluding Hostile M&A Investments by MBK
"Few Positive Precedents and Reputation Concerns"... Obstacles to Public Fund Investments
[Edaily Marketin JI YEONG-EUI Reporter] “Embarking on a hostile merger and acquisition (M&A) deal means placing oneself at the center of controversy and debate. Will major domestic investors really put their money into such a deal?”
Although the government is promoting hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a new means of enhancing corporate value and is even considering establishing a “bear hug” support fund, major domestic public pension funds and mutual aid associations remain reluctant to make such investments.
The National Pension Service has even explicitly stipulated a clause excluding investments in hostile M&A in its private equity fund (PEF) management agreements, and other institutions are also wary of the liability and reputational risks associated with management control disputes. Although the investment market has grown significantly—with uncommitted capital commitments for domestic private equity funds (PEFs) reaching 43.2 trillion won at the end of last year—the investment practices of major investors, who are expected to support management control battles, remain at odds with the government’s vision.
[Edaily Reporter Kim Il-hwan]
Even with an Abundance of Acquisition Capital… Hostile M&As Remain Rare
According to the “2025 Status of Institutional Private Equity Fund Operations” compiled by the Financial Supervisory Service on the 18th, as of the end of last year, there were 1,195 domestic institutional private equity funds (PEFs), with total committed capital amounting to 167.5 trillion won. Of this amount, uncommitted capital totaled 43.2 trillion won, an increase of 7.1 trillion won (19.7%) compared to the end of the previous year. Investments executed over the course of last year amounted to 28.1 trillion won, of which 23.7 trillion won were management-participation investments.
The domestic private equity fund (PEF) market has already grown into a market where management-participation investments worth tens of trillions of won are made. Transactions in which large amounts of capital are raised to acquire management control of companies, increase their corporate value, and then recoup the investment have also been actively taking place. However, these investment funds are rarely directed toward hostile M&A, which involves securing management control without the consent of the existing management.
Last September, the Blue House officially announced that it was considering the establishment of a “bear hug M&A” support fund. A “bear hug M&A” is a strategy in which a prospective acquirer offers a purchase price higher than the market price—even without the consent of the existing management—to pressure the board of directors into making it difficult to reject the acquisition proposal. The plan aims to raise corporate value by fostering competition for control of undervalued companies. Plans were also discussed involving policy financial institutions, such as the Korea Development Bank, providing funding, or utilizing investments by public pension funds—such as the National Pension Service—in private equity funds (PEFs).
However, for major limited partners (LPs)—such as domestic pension funds and mutual aid associations—hostile M&A is an unfamiliar investment area. There is a general reluctance to invest due to concerns that providing funds for management control disputes could lead to controversy. In fact, when the National Pension Service signed a management agreement with MBK Partners in February of last year, it explicitly stipulated that it would not participate in hostile M&A investments. This effectively signaled its refusal following criticism—arising from the controversy surrounding the management control dispute at Korea Zinc—that the investment strategy did not align with the fund’s investment objectives. At the time, the National Pension Service indicated that it would consider incorporating similar conditions into future agreements with other private equity funds.
In September 2024, MBK partnered with Youngpoong, the largest shareholder of Korea Zinc, to launch a tender offer. Controversy over a hostile M&A arose because they sought to secure management control without prior consultation with the existing management led by Chairman Choi Yoon-beom. MBK denied the characterization of a hostile M&A, arguing it was a standard buyout (acquisition of management control) with the consent of the largest shareholder; however, Korea Zinc strongly objected, calling it a hostile takeover attempt aimed at seizing management control.
The problem is that the controversy surrounding this attempt to acquire management control actually affected the investment agreement and the selection of the fund manager. It has been reported that, in addition to the National Pension Service, other limited partners (LPs) internally considered withdrawing their investments or taking legal action. While MBK’s investment strategy was to increase corporate value through the acquisition of management control, domestic investors instead felt burdened by the controversy and the associated liability.
“A Control Dispute with Retirement Funds?”…Why Pension Funds and Mutual Aid Associations Are Reluctant
In reality, domestic institutional investors generally have little experience considering hostile M&A as a major investment strategy or participating in such deals. An official from a mutual aid association pointed out, “Although MBK denied it, the acquisition of Korea Zinc was a hostile M&A pushed forward without the consent of the existing management,” adding, “It’s not that hostile M&A itself is the problem. Institutions managing retirement funds inevitably have almost no precedent or willingness to invest in such high-risk management buyouts, but the issue was that, as a result, investors could become entangled in management control disputes.”
The greater concern, according to analysts, is the reputational risk arising from management control disputes. Even if one agrees that hostile M&A can serve as a means to improve a company’s inefficient management, if disputes drag on or social controversies arise during the actual investment process, investors will find it difficult to avoid being held accountable.
An official from a pension fund stated, “Since there aren’t that many good examples domestically, there is headline risk,” adding, “It could be problematic if we are criticized regarding our responsibilities as investors.”
The official continued, “If the government finalizes the details of a support fund, we could assess its suitability for investment, but this is not an investment area we have been actively considering.”
To Realize the Benefits of a Control Battle… LPs Need a Justification to Act
Hostile M&A is viewed as a means to demand change from companies with poor management performance and to keep existing management in check. However, if an actual takeover is pursued, costs can escalate due to competitive tender offers or litigation, and the longer the control battle drags on, the more uncertain the recovery of investment capital becomes. Korea Zinc’s situation has dragged on and stalled… In particular, public pension funds and mutual aid associations face significant concerns that, even if they generate returns, they could become embroiled in controversy during the dispute. This is why they find it difficult to readily commit funds, even when there are investable companies.
An investment banking (IB) industry official stated, “While we agree with the theoretical premise that hostile M&A can increase corporate value, from an LP’s perspective, government support does not automatically mean they can invest.” The official added, “We must evaluate returns and exit strategies while factoring in the possibility of a protracted dispute, but there are no particularly good precedents to follow.”
Although the government has played the “hostile M&A” card to put pressure on undervalued companies, there are significant obstacles preventing a vigorous competition for management control. This is du…
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