[Edaily Marketin Hur Jieun Reporter] If Homeplus heads straight for bankruptcy, creditors holding trillions of won in claims are expected to face mixed fortunes. Meritz Financial, the largest creditor holding collateralized claims, is guaranteed priority repayment even during liquidation, while holders of asset-backed short-term bonds (ABSTBs)—who provided funds based solely on the merchandise without collateral—are likely to be pushed to the back of the queue in the priority ranking.

Meritz Financial Group, the largest creditor, is considered to be in the safest position amid Homeplus’s bankruptcy crisis. Meritz Financial is a senior secured trust creditor holding 62 Homeplus-owned stores as collateral. Under the Bankruptcy Act, even if bankruptcy proceedings begin, the security interest held by Meritz Financial is recognized as a separate right (security interest), allowing it to exercise its rights independently without being subject to the control of the bankruptcy estate.

Regardless of whether Homeplus undergoes rehabilitation or proceeds to liquidation or bankruptcy, Meritz can be the first to recover its loan principal by selling the real estate—including the supermarket sites and buildings—held as collateral. The 230 billion won in proceeds from the recent sales of Homeplus stores—including the Daejeon Yuseong and Donggwangju branches—are also expected to be absorbed in full by Meritz once the deadline for an immediate appeal passes on the 20th.

On the other hand, the fate of unsecured creditors—those without collateral—will hinge on whether joint bankruptcy is established. The relatively fortunate group consists of employees and small business partners. As of the end of June, Homeplus’s public-interest claims—including unpaid wages (62.5 billion won) and trade receivables (794 billion won)—totaled 1.08 trillion won. If a joint bankruptcy is established within the 20-day deadline set by the court, these public-interest claims will be converted into foundation claims, granting them the highest priority for repayment. Cash from the liquidation of remaining assets—after Meritz exercises its security interests—or from unsecured assets will be distributed to them first. While full recovery may be difficult, this effectively establishes a minimum line of defense to prevent a domino effect of bankruptcies.

The problem lies with the final group: investors in short-term commercial paper. With a total value of 401.9 billion won, this group involves several hundred individual investors. Last year, during the early stages of the reorganization proceedings, the Emergency Committee for Short-Term Bond Victims and others argued that these bonds were essential for maintaining the distribution network—rather than merely investment funds—and demanded that they be recognized as commercial claims for early repayment. However, 17 months have passed without them ultimately obtaining public interest claim status due to reasons such as legal equity, and it is reported that the repayment process has stalled in the meantime.

If bankruptcy proceedings proceed under these circumstances, the “Jeon-dan” bonds are highly likely to be classified as credit card claims rather than commercial claims. If classified as credit card claims, they will be treated as general bankruptcy claims—not foundation claims—and will be pushed to the back of the queue. Once Meritz’s secured claims are recovered from the bankruptcy estate and the over 1 trillion won in foundation claims are repaid first, virtually no remaining assets will be left for “Jeon-dan” bond investors.

This situation mirrors the cases of Wemakeprice and Interpark Commerce, which previously underwent joint bankruptcy proceedings. In those cases as well, estate claims—such as wages, severance pay, and tax claims—were repaid first, while general creditors, including sellers and consumers, were largely left uncompensated. In the case of Wemakeprice, it was assessed that, with total assets after restructuring amounting to only 48.6 billion won while liabilities reached 446.2 billion won, virtually nothing remained for general creditors.

A lawyer specializing in reorganization and bankruptcy explained, “Although secured creditors—such as employees, executives, and business partners—have the highest priority within the bankruptcy estate, the estate itself consists of residual assets that rank behind Meritz’s secured claims.” He added, “If the proceeds from the sale of the collateralized real estate are insufficient to cover Meritz’s claims, there may be no surplus at all to distribute to these creditors.”