[Edaily Kim Sung-kon Reporter] President Lee Jae-myung’s vote share in the 21st presidential election was 49.42%. This is a clear figure revealed by the vote. Since taking office, the public’s confidence in the president has been gauged by presidential approval ratings from polling agencies. These have consistently hovered in the mid-to-high 60s. Compared to his vote share in the presidential election, this indicates not only the solidarity of his core base but also the support of centrist voters. It is a highly ideal outcome, representing both the retention of his core base and the acquisition of new supporters.

The ruling party held an absolute majority and enjoyed overwhelming public support. Furthermore, the conservative camp repeatedly scored own goals day after day. President Lee’s administration was, quite literally, sailing smoothly. His approval ratings peaked at 67% according to Gallup Korea and 64.6% according to Realmeter. The recent situation is the exact opposite. Following the collapse of his majority, some polls show his approval rating has plummeted to as low as 40%. There are also concerns that the momentum for governing will be undermined going forward. Who exactly has withdrawn their support, and where?

◇“Politics Is Ruled by Poll Numbers” – President Lee Faces a Crisis of Eroding Political Momentum

To put it bluntly, in politics, approval ratings are the “big boss.” With popular support, anything is possible. Representative examples include Ahn Cheol-soo, a member of the People Power Party who emerged like a comet by championing “new politics,” and former President Yoon Suk-yeol, who succeeded in bringing about a change in administration virtually single-handedly by making “fairness” his central theme. They overcame their lack of organizational structure through the power of their approval ratings. The same is true for the Blue House. While its official stance is that it “does not get carried away by or discouraged by approval ratings,” the reality is quite the opposite. When approval ratings soar, everyone from the President to the senior secretaries and aides is beaming. Conversely, when ratings plummet, a heavy atmosphere settles in, broken only by a deafening silence.

President Lee’s approval rating is at a critical level. The days when his approval rating soared in tandem with the KOSPI bull market—including when the index broke through the 9,000 mark—are now a thing of the past. According to Gallup Korea, his approval rating has fallen from a high of 67% to 44%, while Realmeter’s figures have dropped from 64.6% to 40.2%. As recently as before the June 3 local elections, his approval rating hovered around 60%, but in just over two months since then, it has plummeted by more than 20 percentage points. The decline has become particularly steep since the start of August. In surveys by most polling agencies, his approval rating has fallen below the 50% mark, plummeting to the low 40s. Notably, a survey by Jo Won C&I in the third week of August yielded a shocking result of 38.9%. This suggests that centrist voters have largely abandoned him, and even some Democratic Party supporters have begun to withdraw their support. If this downward trend continues, it will become difficult to maintain momentum in governing the nation.

◇ Despite the “KOSPI bull run” and steep gains, approval ratings are falling across the board by generation, region, and political orientation

President Lee’s decline in approval ratings is across-the-board. It cuts across generations, regions, and political affiliations. According to Korea Gallup, his approval rating reached as high as 67% in the second week of April, but it has plummeted to the 40% range since August, falling below the 50% mark. Since the KOSPI broke through the 5,000 mark last January, his approval rating had been on a steady upward trend, soaring to the high 60s around mid-April. The situation even reached the point where the term “God Jae-myung” (a play on his name) began circulating. However, public opinion shifted in an instant. After a gradual decline following the June 3 local elections, his approval rating has recently remained stuck in a downward spiral with no sign of recovery. The mountain of scandals and controversies originating from the ruling party that have erupted since July is truly overwhelming. These range from deteriorating public sentiment regarding the KOSPI and the real estate market to controversies over constitutional amendments for presidential re-election, the Korea Military Academy coup allegations, the abolition of the prosecution’s supplementary investigative authority, and the mudslinging negative campaigning during the August 17 party convention.

The key point to note is the detailed data. A comparison between the second week of April and the third week of August reveals an even more stark decline in President Lee’s approval rating. Among the Democratic Party’s core supporters—those in their 40s and 50s—support plummeted from 80% and 83% to 55% and 50%, respectively. Support among those in their 20s and 30s also plummeted from 38% and 65% to 33% and 37%, respectively. In particular, support among those in their 30s has effectively been cut in half. Even in Honam, the party’s traditional stronghold, support fell by more than 20 percentage points—from a staggering 96% to 71%. Warning signs are also flashing in the Seoul metropolitan area. In Seoul, support plummeted from 62% to 32%, while in Gyeonggi and Incheon, it fell from 63% to 45%. Furthermore, support among the Democratic Party’s core base dropped from 95% to 74%. Support among centrist voters also plummeted from 72% to 43%. In summary, the party is currently maintaining a majority approval rating only among those in their 40s and 50s who live in the Honam region and support the Democratic Party.

◇ An “Irresponsible” KOSPI and a “Volatile” Real Estate Market… Young People Turning Away and Disappointed Supporters

Why have approval ratings fallen? The primary cause is financial losses. Even if the overarching principle is that “investments are one’s own responsibility,” the negative side effects of government policies were simply too severe. First, there is the backlash from the introduction of the Samsung-Nexus leveraged ETF. Rather than stabilizing the exchange rate, it only amplified stock market volatility to the point where circuit breakers and “sidecars” were triggered frequently. It was so bad that Lee Chan-jin, head of the Financial Supervisory Service, even expressed regret, saying, “We should have stopped it even if it meant lying down to block it.” The same goes for real estate. Although President Lee publicly declared that “normalizing the real estate market is easier than cleaning up a mountain stream” and “we will not use taxes to curb housing prices,” the reality was the exact opposite. After wavering between expanding supply and curbing demand, the government once again reverted to a “just supply more” approach, throwing everything into disarray. Only those who, hoping for the best, believed in the government’s policy of “shifting money from real estate to the stock market” ended up looking like fools.

The problem lay with the personnel decisions needed to correct this. While the opposition launched a campaign calling for his dismissal—and even some within the ruling party raised questions about the responsibility of Kim Yong-beom, the Blue House Chief of Policy—President Lee remained silent. Although the circumstances were somewhat different, this contrasted with President Lee’s swift action regarding controversial appointees such as the Commissioner of the Korea Forest Service and the Head of the Trade Negotiations Office. Despite the continued deterioration of public sentiment, Democratic Party lawmakers refrained from making public comments, hoping for a cabinet reshuffle after the party convention. Subsequently, Rep. Kim Young-jin, a member of the “Pro-Myeong Group of Seven,” stepped forward. Appearing on MBC Radio’s “Kim Jong-bae’s Focus” on the 27th, Rep. Kim pointed to real estate policy and the introduction of the Samsung Electronics Leverage ETF as causes for the president’s declining approval ratings. He then raised the issue of dismissing Kim Yong-beom, stating, “He must bear some responsibility.” Earlier, Cho Kuk, director of the Innovation Policy Research Institute at the Cho Kuk Innovation Party and a figure within the broader ruling bloc, had also publicly called for Kim Yong-beom’s dismissal.

◇President Lee’s Approval Rating Expected to Fluctuate Within the “35–40% Range” Without a Rebound

Traditional supporters continue to drift away in reaction to President Lee’s pragmatic policy of expanding his centrist base. Following the “ABC theory,” the “redevelopment theory,” and the “certain defeat theory,” some supporters now agree with writer Yu Si-min’s criticism that the president is an “arrogant person in power.” This is a symbolic scene illustrating the internal division within his support base, despite fierce backlash from the pro-Myeong faction. In particular, it is significant that at the Democratic Party’s August 17 national convention, despite President Lee’s clear signal, Party Leader Kim Min-seok secured only a majority through preferential voting. This proves the existence of a support base that prioritizes the values and philosophy of the democratic-progressive camp over President Lee’s centrist, pragmatic expansionist course. In retrospect, the division within the President’s support base was, in fact, foreseeable following the forced appointment of Choi Dong-seok as head of the Personnel Innovation Agency—a move criticized as declaring that “Moon Jae-in is the source of all the suffering our people are experiencing today.”

The defection of the youth demographic—a group the Lee Jae-myung administration had worked hard to court—is also severe. Their support rate is roughly 10 percentage points lower than the national average. Clumsy real estate policies—such as “abandoned bus” housing and bathtubs in gosiwons—have sparked anger among young people who feel the “ladder to homeownership” has been severed. In particular, after the abolition of supplementary investigative powers, the police’s inadequate investigations into the Busan “roundhouse kick” incident and the Gwangju Jang Yun-gi case were confirmed, leading to a widespread withdrawal of support from women in their 20s and 30s, who had been a key pillar of support.

Eom Kyung-young, director of the Era Spirit Research Institute, stated, “The ‘structural majority’ that President Lee Jae-myung has emphasized is a combination of support from the majority of people in their 40s and 50s and women in their 20s and 30s,” adding, “The ‘86 Generation’ withdrew their support due to financial losses resulting from the stock market crash and the chaos in real estate policy, while women in their 20s and 30s withdrew their support in reaction to the abolition of supplementary investigative powers. “Given that restoring the ‘structural majority’ will not be easy, future approval ratings are expected to fluctuate within a range of 35–40%,” he predicted.