[37th SRE][Cover] “Like selling rotten apples with an ‘eco-friendly certification’ label”… Responsibility placed solely on individuals
[37th SRE]
Lee Bok-hyun, Former Head of the Financial Supervisory Service, Representing Victims of the Joongang Group Bond Scandal
Financials Hidden Behind Unlisted Affiliates… “Individuals Couldn’t See What Was Inside the Apple”
"If I’d known that information, I wouldn’t have invested"... Calls for Strengthened Disclosure in the Bond Market
[Edaily Marketin Song Seung-Hyeon Hur Jieun Reporter] “It’s like selling apples with worms in them—Homeplus simply displayed them on the shelves and sold them, while JTBC sold them with an eco-friendly certification called ‘public offering’ attached.”
Lee Bok-hyun, former head of the Financial Supervisory Service, summarized the Joongang Group bond crisis in this way during an interview with E-Daily at his office in Jung-gu, Seoul. This is the first case he has taken on since stepping down as head of the FSS. Three months after taking the case, he represents 286 individual victims, with the value of the bonds entrusted to him alone totaling around 30 billion won. According to the legal team’s own tally, approximately 450 accounts and about 76 billion won in investment funds are at stake.
Former FSS Chairman Lee Bok-hyun answers questions during an interview with E-Daily. [Photo by Reporter Kim Tae-hyung]
Investment-Grade Bonds Defaulted in Just Four Months… Capital Erosion Overshadowed by Hybrid Capital Securities
Corporate bonds and electronic short-term notes issued by affiliates of the Joongang Group received investment-grade ratings at the time of issuance. However, after JTBC defaulted on its loans last June, Joongang Holdings, Contentsree Joongang, and Megabox Joongang successively filed for rehabilitation. In effect, bonds that were rated investment grade turned into defaults in just over four months.
The JoongAng Group crisis is considered one of the most significant incidents this year involving losses for retail investors that have shaken the capital markets. The media group—headed by JoongAng Holdings and comprising dozens of affiliates, including JoongAng Ilbo, JTBC, Contentre JoongAng, and Megabox—has issued a series of corporate bonds, electronic short-term notes, and hybrid capital securities through its affiliates since the beginning of the year. Some of these were public offerings led by underwriters. However, when JTBC failed to repay its securitization loans last June, the liquidity crisis spread throughout the entire group, and JTBC followed JoongAng Holdings, Contentree JoongAng, Megabox JoongAng, and JoongAng P&I in entering rehabilitation proceedings one after another. The fact that most of the domestic affiliates were unlisted companies—leaving no clear window for outsiders to scrutinize their financial condition—exacerbated the damage. Meanwhile, the bonds ended up in the hands of individual investors rather than institutions. While the investment-grade rating and the public offering format supported the belief that “the group’s reputation guarantees safety,” individual investors had no way of verifying the financial risks across the entire affiliate network that actually determined repayment capacity.
According to former President Lee’s analysis, hybrid capital securities were the key mechanism used to obscure the group’s financial situation during this process. When issued, these hybrid capital securities—which function like perpetual bonds—are classified as equity on the balance sheet; when affiliates purchase them from one another in a chain-like manner, the group’s total equity is inflated, and capital erosion is concealed. A cycle also repeated itself in which, as losses accumulated, the group would issue public bonds to cover them and then funnel the proceeds to affiliates as loans to keep the system afloat. He reported that there were even instances where special-purpose companies (SPCs) issued short-term securitized securities and distributed them to the market, only for the issuer to buy them back when they failed to sell. Regarding this, former Director Lee pointed out, “Yet this financial condition was never properly disclosed in any business reports or prospectuses.”
Failed Gatekeepers… “If They’re Just Going to Stamp Papers, Why Have Credit Ratings?”
Former Director Lee said that after leaving the public sector and examining the case, his perspective on the market had changed. His firm belief is that financial companies—as a highly regulated industry with high barriers to entry and effectively monopolistic platforms—operate in a “structure where it’s easy to make money once you’re in,” and therefore must serve as gatekeepers in a market characterized by significant information asymmetry. However, the reality was different. He said, “Since I’ve been representing the victims, I can’t claim to be entirely neutral, but—to put it much more charitably than one might expect—or, to put it more harshly, financial companies were conducting business in a predatory manner.” His point is that if even one of the issuers, accounting firms, underwriters, or credit rating agencies had acted as a gatekeeper, the transaction would have been filtered out along the way.
The problem lies in the fact that those gatekeepers failed to function. Former Director Lee pointed out a structure in which subprime securities are offloaded onto individual investors as institutional demand declines. Whereas in the past, institutions absorbed the majority of a 10 billion won issuance, he explained that now, with issuance amounts having increased to 20 to 30 billion won, institutions take only a portion and sell the remainder to individual investors. He pointed out, “Although it’s claimed that the securities were distributed to institutional investors, there is no information anywhere indicating that they were actually sold off to retail investors.” After taking on the case and reviewing the relevant materials, he reported that product prospectuses were often fabricated after the fact, and there were even instances where the risk disclosure section hadn’t even been checked off.
He also had much to say regarding credit ratings. The JTBC bonds received a BBB rating at the time of issuance. The credit rating agency explicitly stated in its rating opinion that it did not reflect the repayment capacity of the parent company or affiliates; he interpreted this as a roundabout way of saying, “The affiliates do not have the financial capacity to provide funds.” Nevertheless, the defense team claims that the lead underwriter presented the situation to investors in the opposite light, implying that the group’s repayment capacity was robust. While acknowledging that credit rating agencies operate in a de facto monopoly and are not easily replaceable, he expressed the view that “the question of whether it is appropriate for them to simply rubber-stamp ratings has been consistently raised for some time.” He noted that the long-standing question—which first arose during the global financial crisis regarding the rating of structured bonds—namely, “Did the credit rating agencies properly assess the risks inherent in the ratings they assigned?”—has resurfaced in this case as well.
“The responsibility for weeding out the rotten apples cannot be placed solely on individuals”
As former head of the Financial Supervisory Service, Lee handled the Hong Kong Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (H-Index) equity-linked securities (ELS) and Homeplus short-term bond crises; he now stands on the side of the victims. He viewed the ELS issue as a failure to explain the product’s structure, rather than the product itself being “rotten.” In contrast, regarding the Homeplus and JTBC cases, he stated that “rotten apples were sold,” and noted that the Joongang Group scandal is even more deserving of criticism since it was cloaked in the guise of a public offering. Although authorities worked hard to modernize the capital markets, he also expressed self-reflection, saying, “Even though the market has grown in size, I don’t see what has actually changed.” He argued that we have entered an era of unlimited personal liability, where even if hundreds of people lose tens of billions of won, they cannot do anything unless they hire a lawyer. His conclusion is that the responsibility for weeding out the rotten apples cannot be placed solely on individuals.
To prevent a recurrence of the Joongang Group bond crisis, he identified “strengthening disclosure requirements” as the most realistic solution. He pointed out that key information—such as distribution channels that were disguised as institutional acquisitions but actually flowed to individuals, and structures where hybrid capital securities were issued in a circular manner among affiliates to conceal capital erosion—was nowhere to be found. In particular, regarding the accounting practice of mutually acquiring hybrid capital securities without writing off the loans, he stated, “This should have been disclosed, even if only in the footnotes, and in my view, it also has elements of window-dressing.” “If I had known this information, I would not have invested,” he concluded after meeting with the victims. While acknowledging the counterargument that excessive disclosure could stifle the market, he believed that more information regarding issuance and distribution should be disclosed for companies rated below a certain level or those controlled by owners.
Regarding the counterargument that individuals bear responsibility for purchasing investment-grade BBB bonds, he acknowledged it as a “valid point” but drew a clear line, stating, “The principle of self-responsibility is predicated on the provision of adequate information.” “At the very least, if it’s ‘gray’—meaning ambiguous and risky—they should be told it’s gray,” he said. He also pointed out as a challenge that, unlike public offerings, there is not even a channel for individual bondholders to voice their opinions collectively regarding instruments such as electronic short-term bonds. He argued that a structure is needed that allows them to speak up even before a default occurs, stating, “The current system, where victims have to spend large sums of money to hire lawyers just to settle matters, is problematic.”
[This article is excerpted from the 37th SRE (Survey of Credit Ratings by Edaily) booklet produced by Edaily.]
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