Will Stock Prices Rise If Acquisition Thresholds Are Lowered?…The Dilemma of Hostile M&A
[New Strategy for Value Creation, Controversy Over Hostile M&A] ④
Discussions on Revitalizing Hostile M&As Highlight Need for Institutional Reforms
Japan Establishes Criteria for Board Decisions on Takeover Proposals
UK Ensures Opportunity for Minority Shareholders to Sell Through Mandatory Tender Offers
South Korea Also Needs to Revise Takeover and Defense Standards and Strengthen Shareholder Protection
[Edaily Marketin, Reporter YunJi Kim ] As the government considers hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a means to enhance corporate value, calls are growing for the establishment of institutional safeguards before revitalizing the acquisition market. While the intent is to encourage management improvements at undervalued companies by applying pressure from the threat of losing control, concerns are being raised that simply lowering the barriers to acquisition could fuel wasteful management control disputes rather than increasing corporate value.
The purpose of promoting hostile M&A is to instill a sense of urgency in existing management through competition for control. Even if a company’s stock price is undervalued, there is little incentive to change management practices as long as control can be maintained stably; however, the situation changes when an external acquirer emerges. To retain control, the company must increase its corporate value and expand shareholder returns.
However, simply because an external acquirer emerges does not necessarily mean that relinquishing control is in the shareholders’ best interest. This is because if the price offered by the acquirer does not sufficiently reflect the company’s growth potential, the existing management’s defense of control may actually align with shareholder interests. A prime example is the U.S. industrial gas company Airgas, which in 2010 received a takeover offer of $70 per share from its competitor Air Products but rejected it, judging that the offer fell short of the company’s true value. After continuing to operate independently, the company was sold to France’s Air Liquide in 2016 for $143 per share. While factors such as corporate growth and changing market conditions played a role, the transaction was finalized at more than double the price of the offer made six years earlier.
Conversely, there is a risk that corporate value could be eroded if excessive costs are incurred in defending control. This is because an acquirer may take on excessive debt to secure control, while the existing management may mobilize company funds to block the takeover, thereby increasing the company’s financial burden. In the control dispute between South Korea’s MBK Partners and Korea Zinc, both sides invested massive amounts of capital in tender offers and acquiring shares. As the competition for control drags on, the costs of both the takeover and the defense increase; therefore, experts point out that it is essential to consider not only who secures control but also the burdens incurred during the process and the post-acquisition business performance.
[Edaily Reporter Lee Mi-na]
How have other countries addressed this issue? In 2023, Japan established guidelines for corporate acquisitions, specifying the criteria boards of directors must follow during management control disputes. To prevent existing management from rejecting acquisition proposals solely to defend control, the guidelines require boards to prioritize corporate value and shareholder interests, while also reviewing the acquirer’s ability to secure funding and its post-acquisition business plan. This approach checks arbitrary takeover defenses by management while still allowing companies to respond to acquisitions that could potentially undermine corporate value.
While Japan has specified the criteria for board decisions on takeover proposals, the United Kingdom has established institutional safeguards to ensure that the benefits of control transactions are not concentrated solely among major shareholders. Under the UK’s Takeover Code, an acquirer who acquires 30% or more of the voting rights is, in principle, obligated to launch a mandatory public tender offer for all remaining shares. This measure is intended to prevent a situation where major shareholders reap the control premium while ordinary shareholders are denied even the opportunity to sell their stakes.
Consequently, observers in the capital markets point out that simply lowering the threshold for takeovers is insufficient to stimulate competition for control. They argue that it is necessary not only to assess the acquirer’s ability to raise funds and its post-acquisition business plan but also to curb excessive defensive measures by the existing management. A capital market official stated, “While making it difficult to seize control is a problem, simply handing over control to an acquirer just because they have the funds is not the right answer either,” adding, “It would be ideal for the board of directors to thoroughly review the acquisition terms and business plans and establish procedures that allow shareholders to make informed decisions based on that information.”
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