[Edaily Reporter Park Soon-yeop] With the implementation of dual listing regulations scheduled for July, analysts predict that the role and financial stability of holding companies will become increasingly important. As it will become more difficult to proceed with the listing of subsidiaries based solely on the judgment of the board of directors, as was the case in the past, the approval process by the parent company’s common shareholders and the holding company’s ability to raise funds are expected to emerge as key factors determining the holding company’s valuation.
Lee Kyung-yeon, a researcher at Daishin Securities, stated in a report on the 16th, “The dual listing regulations shift the approach to subsidiary listings from ‘general permission’ to ‘principle of prohibition with exceptions,’ and require a substantive consent process from the parent company’s general shareholders as a key condition for granting exceptions.” He added, “As the path for separate listings of subsidiaries is blocked, the parent company’s role in fundraising will grow.”

The core of the dual listing regulations goes beyond simply raising listing review standards. The emphasis lies in separating the capital-raising act of a subsidiary’s listing from the unilateral authority of the existing board of directors and placing it under the consent of the parent company’s general shareholders. Financial authorities have outlined operational independence, managerial independence, and investor protection as the screening criteria for granting exceptions to dual listing regulations. Among these, the investor protection requirement involves verifying whether consent has been obtained from the parent company’s general shareholders and whether proper shareholder communication procedures have been followed.
Consequently, the exercise of voting rights by holding company shareholders is expected to become more significant than in the past. Daishin Securities cited the Huons Group case to highlight the growing trend toward greater effectiveness of common shareholders’ voting rights. The explanation provided is that when the listed affiliate Huons absorbed and merged with its unlisted subsidiary Huons Lab, a structure was formed in which value that would have accrued to shareholders of the holding company, Huons Global, was transferred to Huons shareholders and the owners. In response, a coalition of minority shareholders formed in protest, prompting the company to consider convening an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders and voluntarily complying with the 3% rule.
The analyst noted that even with the same equity structure, the effectiveness of ordinary shareholders’ voting rights varies significantly depending on whether the “individual 3%” or “aggregate 3%” rule is applied. This is because while limiting the voting rights of the largest shareholder and related parties to 3% each leaves the controlling shareholders with considerable influence, aggregating these shares to a 3% cap allows the consolidated votes of general shareholders to determine the outcome of a resolution. This case is interpreted as demonstrating that companies seeking dual listings or similar value transfers in the future may face a double hurdle: the revised Commercial Act and the voting rights of general shareholders.
It is also noteworthy that regulations on dual listings may increase the financial burden on holding companies by limiting their ability to recoup investments through IPOs of subsidiaries. SK Eco Plant is cited as a prime example. SK Eco Plant raised 800 billion won from financial investors (FIs) in 2022 on the premise of an IPO, but when the planned IPO exit was blocked due to the strengthening of the ban on dual listings, it shifted course to a buyback instead of an IPO.
In this process, the holding company, SK Inc., directly purchased shares worth approximately 398.5 billion won, and SK Eco Plant also proceeded with the acquisition of treasury shares worth about 650 billion won to complete the return of FI investments. Daishin Securities assessed that this approach represents one possible path for companies whose IPO exit routes have been blocked. However, it noted that the financial stability of holding companies has become even more critical, as repurchasing and settling FI shares requires the financial strength to handle such transactions.
Differences in financial strength among major holding companies are also expected to come into focus. According to Daishin Securities, based on first-quarter business reports, #LG holds 1.301 trillion won in net cash, with a debt-to-equity ratio of 8% and a debt dependency ratio of 0%. In contrast, #SK had net debt of 6.961 trillion won, and #Hanwha had 5.09 trillion won. Hanwha had the highest debt dependency at 48%, followed by SK at 31%, and #HD Hyundai and #Doosan at around 27% each.
Daishin Securities issued an “Overweight” recommendation for the holding company sector. The investment recommendations for major stocks remained “Buy” for SK, HD Hyundai, Doosan, Hanwha, LG, #CJ, and #Hyosung. Target prices were set at 880,000 won for SK, 410,000 won for HD Hyundai, 2.22 million won for Doosan, 163,000 won for Hanwha, 130,000 won for LG, 260,000 won for CJ, and 300,000 won for Hyosung.
In particular, the target price for Doosan was raised to 2.22 million won. This reflects the strong growth in demand for high-end copper-clad laminates (CCL)—a core material for the Electronics Business Group—driven by increased investment in artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure. Daishin Securities analyzed that the proportion of high-end products in Doosan’s Electronics BG expanded from 73% in 2024 to 82% in 2025, and the average selling price (ASP) also rose by 38.5%, from 49,676 won in the third quarter of 2024 to 68,799 won in the first quarter of 2026.
The analyst explained, “As the revaluation of the core business’s value proceeds, there is room for the holding company discount rate to narrow further,” adding, “In a regulatory environment restricting dual listings, the parent company’s business competitiveness and financial stability will be key factors in the holding company’s revaluation, rather than the possibility of a subsidiary’s listing.”