[Edaily Kim Sang-yoon Reporter Hwang Byung-seo] As the government has officially announced that it is considering a military contribution to ensure free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, attention is focusing on the specific methods of troop deployment. Options being discussed include expanding the operational area of the Cheonghae Unit, which is currently active in the Gulf of Aden, to include the Strait of Hormuz, or dispatching separate assets such as maritime patrol aircraft and logistics support ships. However, the government maintains that it is in the early stages of review, keeping both combat and non-combat missions open for consideration, and that no specific troop levels, vessels, or missions have been decided yet.
A high-ranking Blue House official met with reporters at the Chunju Hall on the 4th and stated, “The ‘substantive contribution’ we have mentioned on several occasions includes a military contribution,” adding, “There are various options for military contributions—including both combat and non-combat roles—and we are conducting a comprehensive review.”
Regarding the term “troop deployment,” the official explained, “Under the Constitution, sending personnel to the field is defined as a troop deployment, regardless of whether the mission is combat or non-combat, or whether it involves one or two people,” adding, “While the term ‘troop deployment’ generally brings to mind combat and large-scale troop movements, this is not necessarily the case, and there may be various options.”
However, the Blue House clarified, “The references to combat participation, non-combat roles, and search operations—in relation to the ‘military contribution’ mentioned by this senior official—are general explanations of various options,” adding, “At present, nothing has been decided regarding any substantive contribution.”

◇2020 Precedent of Deploying the Cheonghae Unit… Protection of South Korean Ships Cited as Priority
The method of deployment may vary depending on the level of active military contribution and the degree of risk involved. The most limited approach involves sending liaison officers or a small support team to share information with relevant countries. Going beyond this, it is also possible to support the safe passage of South Korean ships or to cooperate in the areas of logistics and intelligence necessary for maritime operations.
A more proactive option is to deploy naval forces, such as the Cheonghae Unit, to directly escort merchant ships. This can be divided into two approaches: independent operations under South Korean military command focused on protecting South Korean vessels, or cooperation with international joint efforts led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. While integrating into the command structure of a multinational operation to carry out joint missions would clearly demonstrate South Korea’s contribution to the alliance, it also increases the risk of engagement and the potential for deteriorating relations with Iran.
One option that has been discussed is expanding the operational area of the Cheonghae Unit—which is currently active in the Gulf of Aden—to include the Strait of Hormuz. This approach offers the advantages of enabling a more rapid response than forming a new, separate unit, and clearly maintains a defensive nature focused on protecting South Korean citizens and vessels. However, the Blue House has not officially confirmed any specific plans for dispatching troops or naval vessels, including the use of the Cheonghae Unit.
In 2020, when the situation in the Middle East became unstable due to clashes between the United States and Iran, the government temporarily expanded the Cheonghae Unit’s operational area from the Gulf of Aden to include the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Arabian Gulf. Instead of formally joining the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), South Korea opted for an independent operation under South Korean military command to protect its citizens and vessels.
At that time, no separate National Assembly approval was required, in accordance with the proviso in the deployment approval bill stating, “This includes maritime areas designated for the protection of our citizens in the event of an emergency.” However, the situation may be different this time. Last May, the Ministry of National Defense stated that National Assembly approval would be required if the Cheonghae Unit were to operate outside the maritime areas and missions specified in the existing deployment approval bill.
Some interpret that if the Cheonghae Unit were to go beyond protecting South Korean vessels to participate in a multinational escort operation involving the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and others, or to undertake missions responding to military threats from Iran, such actions could hardly be viewed as a simple extension of the original deployment purpose. Article 60, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stipulates the National Assembly’s right to approve the dispatch of the Armed Forces abroad.
The dispatch of separate assets, such as maritime patrol aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and logistics support ships, is also being discussed as a possible option. Unlike the dispatch of destroyers to directly escort merchant ships, this approach involves sharing tasks such as maritime surveillance, hazardous material response, and logistical support. However, the Blue House drew a line regarding whether specific assets or missions had actually been finalized as part of the deployment plan.
A senior Blue House official, regarding the possibility of deploying military assets, stated, “We are reviewing various aspects and are currently in the stage of consulting with the necessary countries,” adding, “Nothing has been decided yet.”
The official explained, “When the United Kingdom, France, and the United States proposed international solidarity to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, we actively participated in the discussions from the very beginning,” adding, “Several European countries are already engaged in related activities, and we are conducting our own reviews and consultations at a later stage.”

◇Ultimately Considering Troop Deployment Amid Pressure from Trump… National Assembly Approval and Korean Peninsula Readiness Will Determine the Scale of Deployment
The government’s review stems from the economic and security importance of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as repeated pressure from President Donald Trump to contribute.
In a recent interview with Fox News, President Trump argued that while the U.S. spends enormous sums to assist allies such as South Korea, South Korea refused to help when the U.S. requested assistance regarding the Iran issue. He expressed his dissatisfaction, stating that he would “remember” South Korea’s refusal.
Earlier, as the Iran crisis escalated, President Trump publicly named South Korea, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France, demanding they dispatch warships to protect vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. He also repeatedly linked the issue of South Korea’s contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea and alliance expenses.
The Blue House refuted President Trump’s claim that South Korea had provided no assistance whatsoever, stating that it was contrary to the facts. A senior Blue House official stated, “We had been engaged in consultations to make a substantive contribution to the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz even before President Trump made those remarks,” adding, “We have continued these consultations both during and after his remarks.”
However, it appears there have been no recent phone calls between the South Korean and U.S. leaders regarding this issue. The official said, “Aside from what has already been reported, there have been no recent phone calls between the two leaders,” adding, “At this time, there are no specific plans for a call.”
Meanwhile, for the deployment to the Strait of Hormuz to actually proceed, it must go through domestic legal procedures. Article 60, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stipulates the National Assembly’s right to approve the dispatch of the Armed Forces abroad. The key factor in determining whether the National Assembly will grant approval appears to be not simply whether troops are being sent to the Strait of Hormuz, but whether the deployment exceeds the regions, purposes, and missions authorized by the existing dispatch approval resolution.
A high-ranking Blue House official said, “To make a substantive contribution, we must take into account our readiness posture on the Korean Peninsula and consider domestic legal procedures,” adding, “I believe domestic legal procedures imply consultation with or consent from the National Assembly, but we have not yet reached that stage.” The official continued, “I believe we can act within the scope that does not significantly compromise our readiness posture on the Korean Peninsula.”
At the upcoming South Korea-France summit in Paris on the 8th (local time), international cooperation to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is likely to be discussed. The official explained, “France was the first country to take proactive steps toward international solidarity for freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and has been consulting with us,” adding, “We cannot rule out the possibility that this issue will be discussed at the summit.”
The government is expected to decide on the method and scale of the troop deployment based on the results of future consultations with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and others, taking into account the risks of the mission, the Korean Peninsula’s defense posture, whether the National Assembly will grant approval, and relations with Iran.